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In recent years there has been a growing interest in the study of specic classes of non-
cooperative games for which there exist pure strategy Nash equilibria. This paper deals
with games derived from congestion models. In a congestion model, players use sever-
al facilities | also called machines or (primary) factors | from a common pool. The
costs or benets that a player derives from the use of a facility are, possibly among other
factors, determined by the number of users of that same facility.
Congestion models can, for instance, be used to model the foraging behavior of a
population of bees in a eld of ﬂowers. In deciding which ﬂower to visit, each insect will
take into account the quantity of nectar available and the number of bees already on the
ﬂower, because, as is intuitivelyclear, the more crowded the source of nectar, the less food
is available per capita. In economics this kind of problems is studied in the literature
on local public goods, where it is common to speak about \anonymous crowding" (cf.
Wooders, 1989) to describe the negative externality arising from the presence of more
than one user of the same facility. Another example is the problem faced by a set of
unemployed workers who have to decide where to emigrate to get a job. The attraction of
dierent countries depends on the conditions of the local labor market and, on the other
hand, a crowding-out eect reduces the appeal of emigrating.
Rosenthal (1973) constitutes one of the pioneering papers on congestion games. In
his model, each player chooses a subset of facilities. The benet associated with each
facility is a function only of the number of players using it. The payo to a player is
the sum of the benets associated with each facility in his strategy choice, given the
choices of the other players. Monderer and Shapley (1996) dene exact potential games,
games where information concerning the Nash equilibriacan be incorporated in a potential
function, a single real-valued function on the strategy space. Strategy proles maximizing
the potential are Nash equilibria of the potential game. By constructing a potential
function for Rosenthal's congestion games, the existence of pure-strategy equilibria can
be established.
Section 2 reviews some results on exact potential games. Section 3 describes Rosen-
1thal's congestion games. Monderer and Shapley (1996) not only prove that every such
congestion game is an exact potential game, but also establish that every exact potential
game is isomorphic to a congestion game. Section 3 provides a new, considerably simpler
proof of this result.
Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997), Milchtaich (1996), and Quint and Shubik
(1994) considered dierent classes of congestion games which in general do not admit
a potential function, but were still able to prove the existence of pure Nash equilibria.
Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997), considering the same model as Milchtaich, have
even shown the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium. Section 4 aims to clarify the
relations and dierences between these three classes of congestion games.
In Sections 5 and 6 we return to potential games and focus on a class of congestion
games that combines features from the congestion models mentioned above. This class is
shown to have interesting properties. Our main interest is in the relation between strong
Nash equilibria and potential-maximizing strategies. In particular, it is shown that for
each game in this class the set of strong Nash equilibria is nonempty and coincides with
the set of Nash equilibria and the set of potential-maximizing strategies.
In Section 5 we analyze the geometric properties of this class of games, showing that
it can be represented by a nitely generated cone. The aim of this section is twofold.
First, it provides an easy way to compute potential-maximizing strategies, and second, it
facilitates the proof that the sets of strong Nash equilibria, Nash equilibria, and potential-
maximizing strategies are equal.
Implications of relaxing some of the assumptions underlying the congestion eect are
d i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n7 .
Summarizing, this paper has four main goals:
 To provide a simple proof of the isomorphism between exact potential games and
Rosenthal's congestion games in Section 3;
 To clarify the relations and dierences between the models of Konishi et al. (1997),
Milchtaich (1996), and Quint and Shubik (1994) in Section 4;
 To study the relation between potential-maximizing strategies and (strong) Nash
2equilibria in a special class of congestion games, through the study of the structure
of this class of games, which provides an easy way to nd potential-maximizing
strategies. This topic is taken up in Sections 5 and 6;
 To indicate the consequences of possible relaxation of several assumptions concern-
ing the congestion eect in Section 7.
2 Exact potential games
This section denes exact potential games and surveys some results that are used in the
remainder of the paper. A (strategic) game is a tuple G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni,w h e r e
Nis a nonempty, nite set of players, each player i 2 N has a nonempty, nite set Xi of
pure strategies and a payo function ui :
Q
j2N Xj ! I R specifying for each strategy prole
x =( x j) j 2 N 2
Q
j 2 NX j player i's payo ui(x) 2 I R. Mixed strategies are not considered
in this paper. Conventional game-theoretic notation is used: X =
Q
j2N Xj denotes the
set of strategy proles. Let i 2 N. X−i =
Q
j2NnfigXj denotes the strategy proles of i's
opponents. Let S  N. XS =
Q
j2S Xj denotes the set of strategy proles of players in
S. With a slight abuse of notation strategy proles x =( x j) j 2 N2Xwill be denoted by
(xi;x −i)o r( x S;x NnS) if the strategy choice of player i or of the set S of players needs
stressing.
Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduce exact potential games.
Denition 2.1 A strategic game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is an exact potential game if
there exists a function P : X ! IR s u c h t h a t f o r a l l i 2 N , for all x−i 2 X−i,a n da l l
x i ;y i2X i:
u i(x i;x −i)−u i(y i;x −i)=P( x i;x −i)−P(y i;x −i):
The function P is called an (exact) potential (function) for G. /
In other words, a strategic game is an exact potential game if there exists a real-valued
function on the strategy space which exactly measures the dierence in the payo that









Figure 1: Two exact potential games
Example 2.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma game of Figure 1a is an exact potential game
with an exact potential function given by P(c;c)=5 ;P(c;d)=P( d;c)=4 ;P(d;d)=3 .
The game in Figure 1b is an exact potential game with an exact potential function given
by P(T;L)=0 ;P(T;R)=1 ;P(B;L)=2 ;P(B;R)=3 . /
If G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni has an exact potential P, the denition of an exact potential
game immediately implies that the Nash equilibria of G and hN;(Xi)i2N;(P)i2Ni,t h e
game obtained by replacing each payo function by the potential P,c o i n c i d e .
Proposition 2.3 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be an exact potential game. Then G has
at least one (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let P be an exact potential for G.S i n c e X is nite, argmaxx2X P(x)i sa
nonempty set. Clearly, all elements in this set are pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
2
Facchini et al. (1997) provide a characterization of exact potential games by splitting
them up into coordination games and dummy games.
Denition 2.4 A game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is a
 coordination game if there exists a function u : X ! IR s u c h t h a t u i = u for all
i 2 N;
 dummy game if for all i 2 N and all x−i 2 X−i there exists a k 2 IR s u c h t h a t
u i( x i;x −i)=kfor all xi 2 Xi.
/
In a coordination game, players pursue the same goal, reﬂected by the identical payo
functions. In a dummy game, a player's payo does not depend on his own strategy.
4Theorem 2.5 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a strategic game. G is an exact potential
game if and only if there exist functions (ci)i2N and (di)i2N such that
 ui = ci + di for all i 2 N,
h N;(Xi)i2N;(ci)i2Ni is a coordination game, and
h N;(Xi)i2N;(di)i2Ni is a dummy game.
Proof. The `if'-part is obvious: the payo function of the coordination game is an exact
potential function of G. To prove the `only if'-part, let P be an exact potential for G.F o r
all i 2 N, ui = P +( u i−P). Clearly, hN;(Xi)i2N;(P)i2Ni is a coordination game. Let
i 2 N;x−i 2 X−i,a n dx i;y i 2X i.T h e nu i ( x i ;x −i)−u i(y i;x −i)=P( x i;x −i)−P(y i;x −i)
implies ui(xi;x −i)−P(x i;x −i)=u i( y i;x −i)−P(y i;x −i). So hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui − P)i2Ni is
a dummy game.
2
The dierence between two exact potential functions of a game is a constant function.
Proposition 2.6 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a game with exact potential functions
P and Q. Then P − Q is a constant function.
Proof. Let i 2 N. By Theorem 2.5, ui − Q and ui − P do not depend on the strategy
choice of player i. Hence (P −Q)=( u i−Q )−( u i−P) does not depend on the strategy
choice of player i. This holds for every player i 2 N:( P− Q ) is a constant function.
2
Proposition 2.6 implies that the set of strategy proles maximizing a potential function
of an exact potential game does not depend on the particular potential function that is
chosen. Potential-maximizing strategies were used in the proof of Proposition 2.3 to show
that exact potential games have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. The potential maximizer,
formally dened for an exact potential game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni as
PM(G)=f x2Xjx2argmax
y2X P(y) for some potential function P of Gg
can therefore,as suggested by Monderer and Shapley (1996), act as an equilibrium rene-
ment tool. Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) provide an axiomatic approach to potential-
maximizing strategies.
53 Rosenthal's congestion model
In a congestion model, players use several facilities | also called machines or (primary)
factors | from a common pool. The costs or benets that a player derives from the use of
a facilityare, possibly among other factors, determined by the number of users of a facility.
The purpose of this section is to describe the congestion model of Rosenthal (1973). In
this model, each player chooses a subset of facilities. The benet associated with each
facility is a function only of the number of players using it. The payo to a player is the
sum of the benets associated with each facility in his strategy choice, given the choices of
the other players. By constructing an exact potential function for such congestion games,
the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria can be established. Moreover, Monderer
and Shapley (1996) showed that every exact potential game is isomorphic to a congestion
game. Their proof is rather complex. In this section we present a dierent proof which
is shorter and in our opinion more intuitive. In fact, we use the decomposition of exact
potential games into dummy games and coordination games stated in Theorem 2.5 to
decompose the problem into two subproblems. It is shown that each coordination game
and each dummy game is isomorphic to a congestion game.
A congestion model is a tuple hN;F;(Xi)i2N;(wf)f2Fi,w h e r e
Nis a nonempty, nite set of players;
 F is a nonempty, nite set of facilities;
 For each player i 2 N, his collection of pure strategies Xi is a nonempty, nite
family of subsets of F;
 For each facility f 2 F, wf : f1;:::;ng!I R is the benet function of facility f,
with wf(r);r2f 1 ;:::;ng, the benets to each of the users of facility f if there is a
total of r users.
This gives rise to a congestion game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni where N and (Xi)i2N are as
above and for i 2 N, ui : X ! I R is dened thus: for each x =( x 1;:::;x n)2X,a n de a c h
f2F,l e tn f( x )=jfi 2 N : f 2 xigj be the number of users of facility f if the players
6choose x.T h e nu i ( x )=
P
f2 x iw f( n f( x )). This denition implies that each player derives
benet from the facilities he uses, with benets depending only on the number of users of
the facility. Notice that benet functions can achieve negative values, representing costs
of using a facility.
The main result from Rosenthal's paper, formulated in terms of exact potentials, is
given in the next proposition. Its proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Proposition 3.1 Let hN;F;(Xi)i2N;(wf)f2Fi be a congestion model and G its congestion
game. Then G is an exact potential game. A potential function is given by P : X ! IR







Since X is nite, the game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni and H = hN;(Yi)i2N;(vi)i2Ni be two strategic games with
identical player set N. G and H are isomorphic if for all i 2 N there exists a bijection
'i : Xi ! Yi such that
ui(x1;:::;x n)=v i( ' 1( x 1) ;:::;' n(x n)) for all (x1;:::;x n)2X:
A congestion game where the facilities have non-zero benets only if all players use it as
part of their strategy choice is clearly a coordination game. Also, each coordination game
can be expressed in this form, as shown in the proof of the next theorem.
Theorem 3.2 Each coordination game is isomorphic to a congestion game.
Proof. Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(u)i2Ni be an n-player coordination game in which each
player has payo function u. Introduce for each x 2 X a dierent facility f(x). Dene
the congestion model hN;F;(Yi)i2N;(wf)f2Fi with F = [x2X ff(x)g,f o re a c hi2N :
Y i=f g i ( x i )jx i2X i gwhere gi(xi)=[ x − i2 X − i f f( x i;x −i)g,a n df o re a c hf ( x )2F:
w f( x )( r )=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
u ( x )i f r = n
0o t h e r w i s e
7For each x 2 X: \i2Ngi(xi)=f f ( x ) g , so the game corresponding to this congestion
model is isomorphic to G (where the isomorphisms map xi to gi(xi)).
2











Figure 2: A coordination game
Example 3.3 Consider the coordination game in Figure 2a. For each strategy prole we
introduce a facility as in Figure 2b. These are the facilities that we want to be used by
both players if they play the corresponding strategy prole. To do this, give each player
in a certain row (column) all facilities mentioned in this row (column). For instance,
the second strategy of the row player will correspond with choosing facility set fC;Dg.
Now indeed, if both players play their second strategy, facility D is used by both players
and all other facilities have one or zero users. Dening the benets of D in case of two
simultaneous users to be 3 and in case of less users zero, we obtain the payo (3;3) in the
lower righthand corner of Figure 2c. Similar reasoning applies to the other cells. /
Consider a congestion game in which the benets for a facility are non-zero only if it is
used by a single player. If for each player, given the strategy choices of the other players,
it holds that his benets arise from using one and the same facility, irrespective of his
own strategy choice, we have a dummy game. Also, as shown in the next theorem, each
dummy game is isomorphic to a congestion game with this property.
Theorem 3.4 Each dummy game is isomorphic to a congestion game.
Proof. Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a dummy game. Introduce for each i 2 N and
eachx−i 2 X−i a dierentfacilityf(x−i). Dene the congestion model hN;M;(Yi)i2N;(wf)j2Fi
8with F = [i2N [x−i2X−i ff(x−i)g,f o re a c hi2N :Y i=f h i( x i)jx i2X igwhere
hi(xi)=f f ( x − i ) j x − i 2 X − i g
[f f ( y − j ) j j 2 N nf i gand y−j 2 X−j is such that yi 6= xig;
and for each f(x−i) 2 M:
wf(x−i)(r)=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
u i( x i;x −i)i f r =1( w i t hx i2X iarbitrary)
0o t h e r w i s e
For each i 2 N, x−i 2 X−i,a n dx i2X i:iis the unique user of f(x−i)i n( h j( x j))j2N and
all other facilities in hi(xi) have more than one user. Why? Let i 2 N, x−i 2 X−i,a n d
x i2X i.T h e nf ( x − i )2h i ( x i )a n df o re a c hj2Nnf i g : f( x − i)= 2h j( x j), so i is indeed
the unique user of f(x−i)i n( h j( x j))j2N.L e tf2h i ( x i ) ;f 6=f(x −i).
 If f = f(y−i)f o rs o m ey − i2X − i ,t h e ny − i6 =x − iimplies that yj 6= xj for some
j 2 N nf i g ,s of=f ( y − i)2h j( x j).
 If f = f(y−j)f o rs o m ej2Nnf i gand y−j 2 X−j with yi 6= xi,t h e nf=f ( y − j)2
h j( x j).
In both cases f has more than one user. So the game corresponding to this congestion
model is isomorphic to G (where the isomorphisms map xi to hi(xi)).
2











Figure 3: A dummy game
Example 3.5 Consider the dummy game in Figure 3a. Introduce a dierent facility
for each prole of opponent strategies as in Figure 3b. Include a facility f(x−i)i ne a c h
9strategy of each player, except for the strategies of players j 2 N nf i gspecied by the
prole x−i. For instance, facility  was introduced for the rst column of player 2; then 
is part of every strategy, except for the rst column of player 2. This yields the strategies
as in Figure 3c. Dene benets for multiple users equal to zero. No matter what player 1
does, if his opponent chooses his second strategy, the benets to player 1 can be attributed
to facility . Assign benet 1 to a single user of this facility. Similar reasoning for the
other payos yields the isomorphic congestion game in Figure 3c. /
In the previous two theorems it was shown that coordination and dummy games are
isomorphic to congestion games. Using the decomposition of Theorem 2.5 we obtain that
every exact potential game is isomorphic to a congestion game.
Theorem 3.6 Every exact potential game is isomorphic to a congestion game.
Proof. Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be an exact potential game. Split it into a co-
ordination game and a dummy game as in Theorem 2.5 and take their isomorphic con-
gestion games as in Theorems 3.2 and 3.4. Without loss of generality, take their fa-
cility sets disjoint. Construct a congestion game isomorphic to G by taking the union
of the two facility sets, benet functions as in Theorems 3.2 and 3.4, and strategy sets





fA;Cg[f ;γ;gf B;Dg[f ;γ;g
fA;Bg[f ;;g 0+0,0+2 1+1,1+2
fC;Dg[f ;;γg 2+0,2+3 3+1,3+3
b
Figure 4: Exact potential game and isomorphic congestion game
Example 3.7 The exact potential game in Figure 1b is the sum of the coordination
game from Example 3.3 and the dummy game from Example 3.5. Combining the two
isomorphic congestion games from these examples yields a congestion game isomorphic
to the exact potential game. See Figure 4. /
104 Congestion games
The games introduced by Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997), Milchtaich (1996), and
Quint and Shubik (1994) are similar, in the sense that the utility functions of the players
are characterized by a congestion eect. The various classes of games we discuss are
identied by means of dierent sets of properties concerning the structure of the strategic
interaction. In particular, Konishi et al. (1997) impose the following assumptions (P1){
(P4) on a game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni.
(P1) There exists a nite set F such that Xi = F for all players i 2 N.
The set F is called the \facility set" and a strategy for player i is choosing an element of
F.
(P2) For each strategy prole x 2 X and all players i;j 2 N:i fx i6 =x jand x0
j 2 Xj is
such that xi 6= x0
j,t h e nu i( x j;x −j)=u i( x 0
j;x −j).
Konishi et al. (1997) call this assumption independence of irrelevant choices:f o r e a c h
player i 2 N and each strategy prole x the utility of i will not be altered if the set of
players that choose the same facility as player i is not modied.
Let x 2 X;f 2 F. Denote as before by nf(x) the number of users of facility f in the
strategy prole x. Then the third property can be stated as follows:
(P3) For each player i 2 N and all strategy proles x;y 2 X with xi = yi:i fn f ( x )=
n f( y ) for all f 2 F,t h e nu i( x )=u i( y ).
This anonymity condition reﬂects the idea that the payo of player i depends on the
number of players choosing the facilities, rather than on their identity. The fourth as-
sumption, called partial rivalry, states that each player i would not regret that other
players, choosing the same facility, would select another one. Formally:
(P4) For each player i 2 N, each strategy prole x 2 X,e a c hp l a y e rj6 =isuch that
xj = xi and each x0
j 6= xi: ui(xj;x −j)< =u i(x 0
j;x −j).
11Although Milchtaich (1996) introduces his model in a slightly dierent way, the resulting
class of games is the same. More specically Milchtaich (1996) introduces the conditions
(P1), (P4), and the following assumption:
(P2') For each player i 2 N and all strategy proles x;y with xi = yi = f:i fn f ( x )=
n f( y ), then ui(x)=u i( y ).
In other words the utility of player i depends only on the number of users of the facility
that i has chosen. Assuming (P1), it is straightforward to prove that (P2') implies both
(P2) and (P3). The converse implication is also true.
Lemma 4.1 Any game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni satisfying (P1), (P2), and (P3) satis-
es (P2').
Proof. Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni satisfy (P1), (P2), and (P3). Let i 2 N, x;y 2 X
such that xi = yi = f and assume that nf(x)=n f( y ). If jFj = 1, (P2') follows directly.
Otherwise, from repeated use of (P2), we know that for a xed g 6= xi, ui(xi;x −i)=
u i ( x i ;x 0





> > > > <
> > > > :
x i if xj = xi;
g otherwise,
and that ui(xi;y −i)=u i( x i;y0





> > > > <
> > > > :
x i if yj = xi;
g otherwise.
Notice that for each h 2 F, nh(xi;x 0
−i)=n h ( x i ;y0
−i). So (P3) implies ui(xi;x 0
−i)=
u i ( x i ;y0
−i). Therefore, ui(xi;x −i)=u i( x i;x 0
−i)=u i( x i;y0
−i)=u i( y i;y −i).
2
Konishi et al. (1997) and Milchtaich (1996) independently proved the following
Theorem 4.2 Each game hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni satisfying (P1), (P2), (P3) and (P4),
possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
12Recall that, given a game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni, a strategy prole x is called a strong
Nash equilibrium if for every S  N and all strategy proles yS 2 XS, there is at least
one player i 2 S such that ui(yS;x −S) < = u i(x). The set of strong Nash equilibria of a
game G is denoted by SNE(G). In general, the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium is
not guaranteed, but Konishi et al. (1997) show
Theorem 4.3 For each game satisfying (P1), (P2) (P3) and (P4), the set of strong Nash
equilibria is nonempty.
Finally, we mention the model introduced by Quint and Shubik (1994), where the as-
sumption that all players have the same set of facilities (as stated by (P1)) is relaxed.
(P1') There exists a nite set F such that Xi  F for all players i 2 N.
Assuming that (P1') holds, it is still easy to see that (P2') implies (P2) and (P3). But
the analogon of Lemma 4.1 does not hold.
Example 4.4 Take N = f1; 2; 3g, F = fa;b;cg and strategy sets X1 = fa;bg, X2 =
fag, X3 = fa;cg. This game satises (P1'). Assumption (P3) imposes no additional
requirements and (P2) requires that u1(b;a;a)=u 1 ( b;a;c)a n du 3 ( a;a;c)=u 3 ( b;a;c).
This does not imply u2(a;a;c)=u 2( b;a;a), which is required by (P2'). /
Quint and Shubik (1994) show
Theorem 4.5 All strategic games satisfying (P1'), (P2') and (P4) possess a pure Nash
equilibrium.
Games in the classes considered so far not necessarily admit a potential function. Consider
now the following cross-symmetry condition, which states that the payos on a certain
facility are player-independent, provided that the number of users is the same.
(P5) For all strategy proles x;y 2 X and all players i;j 2 N:i f x i=y j= fand
nf(x)=n f( y ), then ui(x)=u j( y ).
Notice that (P5) together with (P1) implies (P2'), and thus (P2) and (P3). Moreover,
(P1) and (P5) guarantee the existence of a potential.
13Theorem 4.6 Each game satisfying (P1) and (P5) is an exact potential game.
Proof. Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni satisfy (P1) and (P5). For any f 2 F and x;y 2 X
such that nf(x)=n f( y ), we have by (P5): if there are i;j 2 N such that xi = yj = f,
then ui(x)=u j( y ). This shows that for all f 2 F there exists a benet function wf :
f1;:::;ng!IR s u c h t h a t f o r a l l x 2 X ,i fx i=f ,t h e nu i ( x )=w f( n f( x )). This makes
the game G a congestion game as dened in Section 32. The result now follows from
Proposition 3.1.
2
Remark 4.7 The theorem still holds if (P1') is substituted for (P1). It also follows





As can be seen in the Prisoner's Dilemma in Figure 1a, exact potential games do not in
general possess a strong Nash equilibrium. The remainder of this paper focuses on games
that admit an exact potential and have strong Nash equilibria. Therefore, attention is
restricted to the class C of congestion games satisfying not only (P1) and (P5), but also
(P4). So
C = fG = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2NijGsatises (P1), (P4), and (P5)g: (1)
5 On the structure of the class C
We analyze the structure of the class C dened in (1). Let n 2 I N be a number of players
and F a nite set of facilities. Denote by C(F;n) the set of all games in C with n players
and facility set F. Identifying each game G 2C ( F;n)w i t has e to fv e c t o r s( w f) f2 F like in
the proof of Theorem 4.6, it is shown that C(F;n) is a nitely generated cone in (I R
n
+)F.
The vector notation of the games simplies the proofs of the theorems on strong equilibria
and the potential maximizer presented in Sections 6 and 7.
Let G 2C ( F;n). Recall from Theorem 4.6 that for every f 2 F there exists a function
wf : f1;:::;ng!IR s u c h t h a t f o r a l l x 2 X ,i fx i=f ,t h e nu i ( x )=w f( n f( x )). From
2Where we identify choosing a facility f 2 F with choosing facility set ffgF.
14( P 4 ) ,w eh a v ef o re a c hf2Fand t 2f 1 ;:::;n−1g that wf(t) > = wf(t +1 ) . F o r
convenience and without loss of generality we assume that wf(t) > = 0 for all f 2 F;t 2
f1;:::;ng. This means that the game G 2C ( F;n) is described by jFj vectors of the form
(wf(1);:::;w f(n));f 2F,e a c hi nt h es e tV=f v=( v 1;:::;v n)2IR
n
+ j v t > = v t +1 for all
t 2f 1 ;:::;n−1gg.
Proposition 5.1 The set V is a nitely generated cone in IR
n
+. The extreme directions of
V are the vectors b1;b2;:::;b n with bi =( 1 ;1 ;1 ;1
| {z }
i times
;0;:::;0). Furthermore, dim(V )=n .
Proof. The vectorsb1 =( 1 ;0 ;0 ;:::;0), bi =( 1 ;1 ;1 ;1
| {z }
i times
;0;:::;0),:::,b n=( 1 ;1 ;1 ;1 ;:::;1)
are elements of V and each vector v 2 V can be uniquely written as a nonnegative com-


























So Bn is the nn matrix whose i-th row is bi.S i n c ed e t ( B n ) = 1, the equation Bn = v
has exactly one solution. Clearly,  is nonnegative because of the decreasingness property
of v.T h es e tVis therefore the cone C(Bn)w h e r eC ( B n ): =f  B nj2IR
n
+ g .
The extreme directions of the cone C(Bn) are the vectors bi, i 2f 1 ;:::;ng.T h i sc o n e
has furthermore the property that its dimension is the number of extreme directions. In
other words we have that dim C(Bn)=rank(Bn)=n .
2
Essentially we proved
Corollary 5.2 The class of games C(F;n) can be identied with a cone in (I R
n
+)F and
dim(C(F;n)) = jFjn .
In the next example we consider an extreme game of C(F;n), i.e., a game with facility set
F such that wf is an extreme direction in the cone V for each f 2 F.
15Example 5.3 Let G be a game in C(ff;gg;4) such that wf =( 1 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0) and wg =
(1;1;0;0). Nash equilibria are either those strategy proles in which one of the players
chooses f and the other three g, or those in which both facilitiesare chosen by two players.
These situations will be depicted
( 1 ;0;0;0)
(1;1; 0 ;0)
for the rst case and
(1; 0 ;0;0)
(1; 1 ;0;0)
for the second one, where the numbers in the square boxes indicate the payo received by
each player choosing this facility. Notice furthermore that the players are interchangeable
as suggested by the cross-symmetry condition (P5). One easily checks that all Nash
equilibria are strong. /
6 Strong Nash equilibria and the potential maximiz-
er
In this section it is shown that on the class C, the set of Nash equilibria, strong Nash
equilibria, and potential maximizers coincide:
Theorem 6.1 On the class C of games, SNE =NE =PM.
A proof of this result is given in parts. Recall that for any strategic game G, SNE(G) 
NE(G) and that for any exact potential game G, PM(G)NE(G). It therefore suces
to prove the following propositions.
Proposition 6.2 For each game G 2C ,NE(G) PM(G).
Proposition 6.3 For each game G 2C ,NE(G) SNE(G).
16The proofs are based on the structure of the class C described in the previous section. We
assume n 2 I N and a nite facility set F to be xed. Each game G 2C ( F;n)i sg i v e nb y
a collection of vectors
((wf(1);:::;w f(n)))f2F;
(wf(1);:::;w f(n)) 2f v2IR
n
+ j v t > = v t +1 for all t 2f 1 ;:::;n−1gg:
To compute the potential of Remark 4.7 it is necessary to add the utilities of the used
facilities up to the number of users. This means that in each vector wf all the rst nf(x)
numbers are added.
As a consequence it is clear that by n times consecutively choosing the facilities with
highest remaining numbers, from left on, in the set of vectors f(wf(1);:::;w f(n))gf2F a
potential maximizing prole is found. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 6.4 Let G 2C ( f f;gg;4) such that
wf =( 4 ;3 ;2 ;1)
wg =( 5 ;2 ;1 ;0)
In the rst step we take the rst cell in wg, in the second step the rst cell in wf,i nt h e
third step the second cell of wf and, nally, in the fourth step either the third cell of wf
or the second cell of wg. Consequently, the potential maximizing strategy combinations
are those x 2 F N with nf(x)=3 ,n g( x )=1a n dt h o s ew i t hn f( x )=2 ,n g( x )=2 .N o t i c e
that for these x, P(x) = 14 and that all Nash equilibria are potential maximizing. /
Based on a switching argument the next lemma shows the similarities in utilities for
dierent Nash equilibria.
Lemma 6.5 Let G 2C ( F;n) be determined by ((wf(1);:::;w f(n)))f2F and let x and y
be Nash equilibria of G. For all f;g 2 F such that nf(x) <n f( y )and ng(y) <n g( x ) ,a n d
for all l 2f n f( x )+1 ;:::;n f(y)gand m 2f n g( y )+1 ;:::;n g(x)git holds that
wf(l)=w f( n f( y )) = wg(ng(x)) = wg(m):
17Proof. Let f;g 2 F and l;m be as described in the lemma. Both x and y are
Nash equilibria, so wf(nf(y)) > = wg(ng(y)+1 )> =w g( m )> =w g( n g( x )) > = wf(nf(x)+
1) > = wf(l) > = wf(nf(y)).
2
This lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 6.2.
Proof. [Proposition 6.2] Let G 2C ( F;n) be determined by ((wf(1);:::;w f(n)))f2F.I t
suces to show that P(x)=P( y )i fxis a Nash equilibrium and y a potential maximizing
strategy combination. Let x 2 NE(G)a n dy2PM(G). Facilities f 2 F such that
nf(x)=n f( y )a d da sm u c ht oP ( x )a st oP ( y ). Furthermore, by Lemma 6.5, if nf(x) <
nf(y)a n dn g ( y )<n g ( x ) for certain f;g 2 F then wf(l)=w f( n f( y )) = wg(ng(x)) =
wg(m) for all l 2f n f ( x )+1 ;:::;n f(y)g and m 2f n g ( y )+1 ;:::;n g(x)g. The total
contribution of the facilities in the set ff 2 F j nf(x) 6= nf(y)g to the potentials P(x)
and P(y) is apparently the same.
2
Remains to prove Proposition 6.3.
Proof. [Proposition 6.3].L e t G 2C( F;n)b eg i v e nb y( ( w f(1);:::;w f(n)))f2F and
let x 2 NE(G). Suppose S  N can strictly improve the payo for all its members by
switching to a strategy combination yS 2 F S. Call the resulting strategy combination
y =( y S;x NnS). If nf(y) >n f( x )f o rs o m ef2F,ap l a y e ri2Sexists such that yi = f
and xi = g;g 6= f. This implieswf(nf(x)+1)> =wf(nf(y)) >w g( n g( x )), which contradicts
the fact that x is a Nash equilibrium. So nf(x)=n f( y ) for all f 2 F. Therefore every
player in S chooses a new facility already chosen by a member of S and obtains a higher
utility. Among the utilities assigned to members of S there is a maximum, since S is nite.
Any player in S rewarded with this maximum cannot get more in the new conguration.
Hence a contradiction arises. Every Nash equilibrium is strong.
2
In the last part of this section we consider strictlystrong Nash equilibria. Recall that given
a game hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni, a strategy prole x 2 X is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium
if for all coalitions S  N and strategy combinations yS 2 XS;u i ( y S ;x NnS)=u i( x )f o r
all i 2 S or ui(yS;x NnS)<u i( x ) for at least one i 2 S. The following example illustrates
that the properties of C do not guarantee the existence of strictly strong Nash equilibria.
18Example 6.6 Consider the game G 2C ( f f;gg;3) with wf;w g given by
wf =( 4 ;2;0),
wg =(3;2 ;1),
where the squared numbers depict a strong Nash equilibrium payo. If the two players
choosing f agree that one of them switches to g and the other one sticks to f, the utility
will still be 2 for the switching one but increases from 2 to 4 for the remaining player. A
similar argument holds for the other type of strong Nash equilibria given by
wf =(4;2 ;0)
wg =( 3 ;2;1)
Since these are the only two types of strong Nash equilibria, and neither of them is strictly
strong, strictly strong Nash equilibria do not exist. /
7 Extensions of the model
The class C is characterized by properties (P1), (P4), and (P5). It is obvious that re-
laxation of those properties will have consequences on the result presented in Section
6.
First of all, the classes of congestion games of Quint and Shubik (1994), Milchtaich
(1996), and Konishi et al. (1997) without (P5) not necessarily admit an exact potential.
Secondly, consider the class CP strategic games which satisfy the properties (P1) and
(P5). Each n person game G in CP is a potential game and can be represented by a
collection of arbitrary vectors ((wf(1);:::;w f(n)))f2F 2 (I Rn)F. It is obvious that not
every game G 2C Phas a strong Nash equilibrium. For instance, the Prisoner's Dilemma
in Example 2.2 is an element of CP with F = fc;dg, wc =( 4 ;1) and wd =( 0 ;3), but does
not have a strong Nash equilibrium. But even the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium
for a game G 2C Pdoes not guarantee that each Nash equilibrium is strong too, nor that
a strong equilibrium is a potential maximizer. The next example gives a game G 2C P
such that ;6 =SNE(G)  NE(G)a n dSNE(G)\PM(G)=; .
19Example 7.1 Let G 2C P( f f;gg;3) with
wf =( 4 ;0 ;5)
w g=( 4 ;2 ;0)
The unique strong Nash equilibrium in which all three players chooses facility f is indicat-
ed. By Proposition 4.6, the potential can be computed as in Remark 4.7. The maximal
potential arises at the non strong equilibria which are given by
wf =(4;0 ;5)
wg =( 4 ;2;0)
/
Finally, consider the class of strategic games C0 satisfying (P1'),(P4), and (P5). Similarly
to Proposition 6.3 one can show
Theorem 7.2 For every game G 2C 0,NE(G)=SNE(G).
This result coincides with that of Holzman and Law-Yone (1997, Theorem 2.1). In the
class C0, however, the set of potential maximizing strategy combinations need not coincide
with the set of Nash equilibria, as can be seen in the following example.
Example 7.3 Consider the game G 2C 0( f f;g;hg;5) in which three players have strategy
set ff;hg and two fg;hg. The benet vectors are
wf =( 4 ;2 ; 1;− ;− )
w g=(3;2 ;− ;− ;− )
w h=(2;1 ;1 ;0 ;0)
where the squared numbers depict a Nash equilibrium payo. It represents strategy
combinations in which the three players with strategy set ff;hg all play f.C o n s i d e rn o w
the equilibrium in which two of those three play f and the other plays h.
wf =( 4 ; 2;1 ;− ;− )
w g=( 3 ;2;− ;− ;− )
w h=(2;1 ;1 ;0 ;0)
20The potential can be computed as in Remark 4.7. For the rst type of equilibrium in
this example, the potential value equals 4 + 2 + 1 + 3 + 2 = 12, which is less than
4+2+3+2+2 = 13, the potential value associated to the second type of equilibrium. /
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